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Photography and Writing, or the Intimacy of the Image: a 
dialogic encounter between Barthes’s Camera Lucida and 
Blanchot’s philosophy of Otherness. 
 
Abstract: This article was prompted by James Elkins’ argument - developed in his book, What 
Photography Is, from 2011 - that there is no actual relationship between Roland Barthes’s 
theory of photography and Maurice Blanchot’s philosophy. Drawing on considerations of an 
historical, philosophical, and literary nature, the article argues for the importance of a dialogic 
encounter between Barthes and Blanchot, demonstrating that the interconnection between the 
concepts of image and writing appears as a crucial aspect in the theory of both authors. At the 
same time, by contesting Elkins’ wider criticism of Barthes’s Camera Lucida (1982), the article 
aims to develop better-informed theoretical understandings of Barthes’s thoughts on 
photography. The final section of the article attempts to map promising points of connection 
between Barthes, Blanchot, and Proust, in order to reassess the notion of punctum in its broader 
relation with the concepts of time and death.   
 
Introduction: Elkins on Barthes’s Camera Lucida 
In the texts entitled Writing, and Selenite, Ice and Salt, both included in the book 
What Photography Is (2011), James Elkins harshly criticizes the photographic theory 
developed by Roland Barthes in the book Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography 
(1982).  Elkins begins by presenting a set of general considerations on Camera Lucida. 
He points out that the traumatic event concerning the death of Barthes’s mother impels 
the construction of a disturbing text, patiently weaved around the concepts of death, 
memory, and photography. He then considers that Barthes’s book must be understood 
as a personal, experimental act of writing that intersects with a speculative reading on 
the significance of photography. Consequently, Elkins affirms that the personal writing 
adopted in Camera Lucida appeals to forms of examination that should engage with 
both the analytical and essayistic dimensions of Barthes’s book.  
After introducing these aspects, which are effectively crucial in the assessment 
of Camera Lucida, Elkins advocates writing a book whose strangeness would provoke a 




way to reply to a book as strange as Barthes’s is to write another one even stranger” 
(Elkins 2011, 14).  
It is important to note that Elkins’ overall work offers a sophisticated analysis of 
photography in its relationship with writing, technology, and knowledge. His attempt to 
contest Barthes’s book aims at challenging conventional readings of photography, 
providing an arena for alternative theoretical insights regarding the role of the 
photographic image and visual meaning. Additionally, he pays serious attention to 
alternative practices in which photography intersects with new and emerging forms of 
visuality.  
Notwithstanding, in his analysis of Barthes’s Camera Lucida, Elkins fails to 
contend with its philosophical complexity, ignoring some of the most important 
ontological implications of a book that, as stated by Barthes, is propelled by an 
“ontological desire” towards photography (Barthes 1982, 3). Elkins copiously quotes 
authors who commented on Barthes, but, intriguingly, he never actually addresses the 
authors with whom Barthes maintained a close and influential dialogue. 
Simultaneously, Elkins’ arguments are, at times, surprisingly simplistic, operating in 
terms of binary oppositions between truth and fiction, transparency and opacity, 
immediateness and distance. As a result, the alternative photographic theory that he is 
anxious to construct becomes trapped within dogmatic statements and hasty 
accusations; his premises and revisionist claims are never appropriately substantiated.  
Elkins lingers on the surface of the most important and enigmatic relations 
enacted by Barthes’s book. He seems incapable of grasping what Geoffrey Batchen, for 
example, described as the “double meanings, asides, learned allusions [and] self-assured 
aphorisms” of Camera Lucida. Elkins misreads Barthes by neglecting the importance of 
Camera Lucida as a work of theory and literature that is never purely transparent in its 
meaning, producing its full effect “only in the process of being read” (Batchen 2009a, 
11-12).   
I now would like to quote some initial paragraphs of Elkins’ book that reflect his 
position against Barthes’s theory. This includes Elkins’ opposition to Barthes’s choice 
concerning the title for Chambre Claire, Note sur la Photographie, originally published 
in 1980 (of which Camera Lucida, Reflections on Photography is the English 





Barthes could have called his book Camera Obscura: that would have been historically 
appropriate given photography’s origins, but he wanted an archetypal image of light and 
Enlightenment. He chose Camera Lucida, I suspect, in order to oppose the camera 
obscura’s connotation of darkness (Elkins 2011, 21).  
 
Elkins goes on to say that Barthes’s mention of the camera lucida follows a 
reference to Blanchot’s philosophy: 
 
He quotes Blanchot saying photography is at once “altogether outside, without 
intimacy, and yet more accessible and mysterious than the thought of the innermost 
being” (“Plus inaccessible et mystérieuse que la pensée du for intérieur […] (Elkins 
2011, 21). 
 
Subsequently, in a long parenthesis: 
 
(The Blanchot quotation is one of the darkest moments of Camera Lucida. Even though 
the quotation is pivotal, and even though it is one of the densest and longest of the book, 
Barthes doesn’t say where it comes from, and Derrida did not find the source when he 
cited it in “Les morts de Roland Barthes”. I take the lack of citation as mirror of the lack 
of argument – there is no clear link between the camera lucida and Blanchot’s chains of 
paradoxes […]). 
 
Further, on the same page, and after providing a thorough technical description 
of the camera lucida - characterized as a meticulous and difficult instrument to handle, 
used as a support for drawing, and not exactly for photography - Elkins concludes: 
 
The camera lucida is just wrong for Camera Lucida: it’s not about photography, it is a 
weird, difficult little instrument, not a metaphor of light; and it is not connected, by any 
logic I can follow, to Blanchot’s observations about intimacy.  
 
This article aims to demonstrate that Elkins fails to explore the potential of a 
dialogue between Barthes and Blanchot. Although the relationship between the two 
authors has received no critical attention until now, I argue that the comparative study 
of Barthes and Blanchot emerges as one of the most interesting ways of understanding 




important field of analysis regarding the interplay between text and image, an aspect 
often ignored by most of Barthes’s critics, despite its decisive role in Camera Lucida. 
The article also suggests that serious concerns must be raised about theories that, 
particularly since the emergence of digital technologies, argue for the obsolescence of 
the epistemic and phenomenological principles of the so-called analogic photography.  
I will argue that the phenomenological and ontological implications of Barthes’s 
theory endure as one of the most exciting and important loci from which to discuss the 
meaning of photography, requiring the development of theoretical articulations and 
conceptual insights that have yet to be fully explored.  
 
Problematizing the title of Camera Lucida 
We have seen that Elkins introduces a series of complex issues concerning the 
fields of photography, history, and philosophy. What is at stake here is also the attempt 
to think about the photographic image in its relationship with writing, as can be inferred 
by Elkins’ various references to authors such as Derrida and Blanchot. But, for now, I 
would like to return to the paragraph in which Elkins considers that the camera obscura, 
rather than the camera lucida (a visual device also constructed before the invention of 
photography), would better fit photography’s historical origins.  
The invention of the camera obscura was strongly linked to a technical 
dimension that contributed to the mechanization of both the human vision and the 
artistic gesture. In this sense, the camera obscura influenced the appearance of a new 
type of optical figuring that would be further enhanced by the consolidation of the 
photographic process. However, the architecture of the camera obscura and the 
epistemological criteria presiding over its design - sustained through the rhetoric of 
passiveness and transparency, as well as the stability provided by the geometrical 
perspective and the subsequent centrality of the eye - proved to be inadequate in regards 
to modernity’s new demands towards mobility, flexibility, and perceptual multiplicity.  
Whereas the linear perspective of the camera obscura converges with the 
Cartesian paradigm of knowledge and visual truth, the image of the camera lucida is 
characterized by its vagueness and uncertainty. The camera lucida is an optical device 
formed by a three-sided glass prism, suspended above the surface upon which the artist 
is drawing. It involves the unstable superimposition of the object and the projected 




the image is formed in a very small prism, it “is seen only by the draftsman and by no 
one else, except in the form of a tracing” (Batchen 2009a, 11).  
Thus, the camera lucida disrupts the stability ensured by the model of the camera 
obscura. It reflects the unbalanced physiology and temporality of the human vision, 
revealing a space of intimate and subjective perception. This is why, according to 
Batchen, “Barthes perversely chooses the term [camera lucida] for this inward-looking” 
(Batchen 2009b, 266). In Barthes, the device acts as a metaphor for the work of 
discovering what is not immediately shown by the photographic image. Between the 
apparent objectivity of the document, and the subjectivity of the spectator who 
constructs the image through imagination, the perception of the photograph is 
inseparable from an intimate and emotional search that mobilizes the viewer’s bodily 
and subjective responses.  
Batchen accurately observes that Camera Lucida has an autobiographical tone, 
particularly felt on the passages in which Barthes describes the grief caused by his 
mother’s passing (Batchen 2009a, 11). Nevertheless, more than to privilege personal 
expression, for Barthes the confrontation with photography complicates the subjective 
experience, as he expresses the sense of a continuous investigation that tests and undoes 
the self in the public domain of writing. Famously, the first page of Roland Barthes by 
Roland Barthes is a sentence written in his handwriting: “All this must be considered as 
if spoken by a character in a novel” (Barthes 1977). 
Similarly, in Camera Lucida the personal experience of photography blends with 
a fictional and performative form of writing that aspires to express its nothing-to-say-
ness, thus originating the disruption of the symbolic uses of language and conventional 
analytical tools.  
This aspect acquires, as we will see in detail, special relevance in the second part 
of the book, dominated by Barthes’s passionate investigation of the Winter Garden 
photograph. The photograph was found by Barthes in November 1977, after the death of 
his mother, and shows her in 1898 at the age of five, next to her seven-year-old brother. 
At one point, Barthes describes his attempt to get closer to the clarity that emanated 
from the maternal face. By consecutively enlarging the small area of the loved face 
registered in the photograph, Barthes enters “into the paper’s depth”, in an attempt “to 
reach its other side” (Barthes 1982, 100). But he soon realizes that this other side 
reveals the abstract and formless condition of photography’s paradoxical figuration. 




part of the photograph, incorporating an impossibility of seeing that parallels the 
nothing-to-say earlier identified in the book: 
 
Alas, however hard I look, I discover nothing: if I enlarge, I see nothing but the grain of 
the paper: I undo the image for the sake of its substance; and if I do not enlarge, if I 
content myself with scrutinizing, I obtain this sole knowledge, long since possessed at 
first glance: that this indeed has been [...] Such is the Photograph: it cannot say what it 
lets us see (Barthes 1982, 100).  
 
This episode haunts the entire book as a specter of both photography and 
writing. It shows that the image of the world provided by the photograph is not 
synonymous with exactitude, encompassing effects of entropy and blindness that 
prevent stable interpretations and descriptions. So, Elkins’ suspicions (“He [Barthes] 
chose Camera Lucida, I suspect, in order to oppose the camera obscura’s connotation of 
darkness”), are unfounded. Elkins ignores the subtleties of the historical and 
technological implications that his own description of the camera lucida summons up.  
Ironically, Elkins’ description of the camera lucida ends up highlighting a set of 
qualities that are directly related to the perceptual instability of the device. For example, 
Elkins tells us that operating the camera lucida implies “peering into a small aperture or 
try squinting to a tiny prism”; that when coupled with a microscope, it is difficult to 
“balance the little light” provided by the device with “the bright light of the microscopic 
object”; finally, that the drawing produced by the camera lucida is almost equivalent to 
trying “to read a book without glasses and with a tiny piece of sharp machinery 
hovering a few millimeters from your eye” (Elkins 2011, 22). Curiously, Barthes’s 
metaphoric use of the camera lucida, if read more accurately, would support Elkin´s 
claims developed in earlier works: for example, in The Object Stares Back, he states that 
“just looking” is impossible and that seeing “must always involve force and desire and 
intent” (Elkins 1996, 21).  
However, by misreading the potential of Barthes’s metaphor, Elkins also fails to 
have a more positive approach towards Barthes’s decision. Elkins isolates Barthes’s 
phrase, “It is a mistake to associate Photography, by reason of its technical origin, with 
the notion of a dark passage (camera obscura)” (Barthes 1982, 106), to distort the 
affirmative force of Barthes’s arguments. Elkins establishes an opposition that would 




light and Enlightenment”. However, for Barthes, photography remains something 
unknown and unfinished. The issues concerning evidence and testimony are strictly 
attached to the regime of a radical alterity through which the referent is always the other 
of the represented object, and not its enlightened representation. 
At the same time, Elkins also contradicts his own considerations on Barthes’s 
style of writing, described, at the outset, as healthily freed from academic constraints 
and disciplinary determinations. Elkins overestimates the lack of bibliographical 
reference to Blanchot’s phrase in Camera Lucida. The omission would reflect, 
according to Elkins, a resounding fragility of Barthes’s arguments: “I take the lack of 
citation as mirror of the lack of argument – there is no clear link between the camera 
lucida and Blanchot’s chains of paradoxes […]”, says Elkins.  
Nowhere does Elkins explain why we should discard a relation between Barthes 
and Blanchot. Such authoritative disavowal overlooks decisive aspects of Barthes’s 
photographic theory. It avoids the discussion of important concepts in Barthes’s work, 
such as the concepts of otherness, desire, intimacy, and time. Symptomatically, despite 
their importance for the discussion of Barthes’s theory, Elkins never truly approaches 
these concepts throughout his book.  
As I will try to demonstrate, it is precisely in the context of a conceptual 
discussion of Camera Lucida that a comparative study of Barthes and Blanchot acquires 
a particular relevance, opening up a more integrated and profound understanding of 
Barthes’s thinking on photography.  
 
The fascination of the photographic image 
In Camera Lucida the perplexity motivated by photography is initially identified 
by Barthes as occurring in the images in which he himself appears:  
 
I then experience a micro-version of death (of parenthesis): I am truly becoming a 
specter […] what I am seeking in the photograph taken of me (the ‘intention’ according 
to which I look at it) is Death: Death is the eidos of that Photograph” (Barthes 1982, 74-
75).   
 
In Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, a book that combines personal 




image and text later explored in Camera Lucida), Barthes describes an uncanny 
experience of dissemblance that breaks the mechanisms of psychological identification: 
 
[…] [the photograph of myself] provokes in me a kind of obtuse dream, whose units are 
teeth, hair, a nose, skinniness, long legs in knee-length socks which don't belong to me, 
though to no one else: here I am henceforth in a state of disturbing familiarity: I see the 
fissure in the subject (the very thing about which he can say nothing) (Barthes 1977a). 
 
These passages show that, for Barthes, the link between the photograph and the 
represented object requires the consideration of a visual and epistemological paradox, 
which is genetically inscribed in the very structure of the photograph.  
The result is a particular theory of indexicality that surpasses the idea of a direct 
physical link between the photograph and the thing it represents. It is a way of 
understanding the index in a more complex way than the one provided by Elkins, who 
affirms that the indexical theory was only “helpful for some art criticism in the moment 
of minimalism, when it was important to stress photography’s material nature and its 
independence of ideation” (Elkins 2011, 23).  
According to Barthes, the photographic reference involves the interruption of 
reality and the simultaneous (re)appearance of the object under the form of a spectral 
presence. It involves a type of resemblance that has ceased to represent a stabilized or 
univocal reality: “I do not resemble me more” (Barthes 1977a). Barthes thereby invokes 
the existence of a co-extension between the referent and its other, a theme that would be 
persistently examined by the author in Camera Lucida. For example, in the first pages 
of the book, Barthes writes: “I want a History of Looking. For the Photograph is the 
advent of myself as other: a cunning dissociation of consciousness from identity” 
(Barthes 1982, 12). 
This brings to mind what Blanchot has described, throughout his work, as a 
space of strange intimacy, more profound than any inner thought. In the phrase cited by 
Barthes in Camera Lucida (one of the densest and longest of the book, as correctly 
reminded by Elkins), Blanchot eloquently evokes a paradoxical movement of opposed 
terms to describe the “essence” of the image. In The Book to Come (Le Livre à Venir), 





[…] the essence of the image is to be entirely outside, without intimacy, and yet more 
inaccessible and more mysterious than the innermost thought; without signification, but 
summoning the profundity of every possible meaning; unrevealed and yet manifest, 
having that presence-absence that constitutes the attraction and the fascination of the 
Sirens (Blanchot 2003, 14). 
 
On the one hand, Blanchot asserts that the image is not a gratuitous fantasy. The 
image delivers us to ourselves: “The image is intimate”, since “it makes of our intimacy 
an exterior power which we suffer passively. Outside of us, in the ebb of the world 
which it causes, there trails, like glistening debris, the utmost depth of our passions” 
(Blanchot 1982, 262). On the other hand, in Blanchot the image’s regime of presence as 
absence undermines the rational principles of knowledge and perception. It opens up, in 
short, a space of “impossibility” (Blanchot 1982, 31).   
But why speak of impossibility in Barthes’s case? Because we are faced with the 
impossibility of restoring a linear correspondence between the photographic image and 
the conventional modes of representation and symbolic language; what is at stake here 
is also the impossibility of developing an action towards an end; and, ultimately, the 
impossibility of measuring time and taking hold of presence.  
Indeed, for Barthes, the photographic image violently interrupts the continuous 
flux of reality and reconstitutes it through the exclamatory temporarily of the “that-has-
been” (Barthes 1982, 77). The temporal reality of the photograph implicates the 
disruption of the grammar of the present time. It undermines the possibility of using the 
image as a merely symbolic instance of mediation between the reality and the viewer.  
Both in Barthes and Blanchot, the viewer is attracted by the vision of what is 
impossible to see, a vision that simultaneously returns to itself in a relentless 
perseverance and endless fascination (Blanchot 1982, 33). In Camera Lucida, Barthes 
observes: “[…] trick of vocabulary: we say ‘to develop a photograph’; but what the 
chemical action develops is undevelopable, an essence (of a wound), what cannot be 
transformed but only repeated under the instances of insistence (of the insistent gaze) 
(Barthes 1982, 49). 
For both Barthes and Blanchot, the person who sees in a fascinated way, and 
through fascination itself, does not exactly perceive a real object belonging to the 
tangible world, but something undefined that is part of this medium of fascination. In 




beyond the image, attracting the eye towards an endless search related not only to the 
amazement caused by specific images, but also, in Barthes’s case, to the broader 
ontological quest of photography, prompted by the Winter Garden photograph: 
 
First of all, I did not escape, or try to escape, from a paradox: on the one hand the desire 
to give a name to Photography's essence and then to sketch an eidetic science of the 
Photograph; and on the other the intractable feeling that Photography is essentially (a 
contradiction in terms) only contingency, singularity, risk [...] (Barthes 1982, 20). 
 
Also in this sense, the paradoxical regime evoked by Blanchot must be related, 
within Barthes’s project, both to the photographic image and to the act of writing, the 
later revolving around the mutism and reserve of the former. 
Therefore, contrary to Elkins’ claims, I contend that it is possible to draw 
multiple points of convergence between Barthes’s Camera Lucida and “Blanchot’s 
chains of paradoxes”. What Barthes was pursuing was not an “archetypal image of 
light” that would cancel out the “connotation of darkness”. On the contrary, Barthes was 
trying to conceptualize the constitutive paradox of the photographic image and its 
evasive form of visuality.  
Already in the texts Rhetoric of the Image, and The Photographic Message, 
Barthes examined the specificity of the photographic medium in terms of an “illogical 
conjunction” between space and time. According to Barthes, such an illogical trait of 
the photographic representation originates a new consciousness of the image: “What we 
have is a new space-time category: spatial immediacy and temporal anteriority, the 
photograph being an illogical conjunction between the here-now and the there-then”. 
For Barthes “[the photograph’s] unreality is that of the here-now [and] its reality that of 
the having-been-there […]” (Barthes 1977c, 44).  
Hence, Elkins also misreads Camera Lucida in the context of Barthes’s broader 
investigation on photography, failing to address concepts that were systematically 
explored by Barthes in different moments of his work. As observed by Batchen, many 
of the concepts of Barthes’s earlier semiotic analysis of the photographic image keep 
reappearing in Camera Lucida (Batchen 2009a, 8). This marks Barthes’s interest in 
photography as a “truly unprecedented” “consciousness” of time and material reality.  
The relation between Barthes and Blanchot is equally pertinent in this context, 




perception usually involves a separation from things. But what happens, asks Blanchot, 
when the things we see seem to touch us at a distance, forming a kind of contact, or 
proximity, that imposes itself through distance? This is not an actual contact, says 
Blanchot. Rather, it concerns an act of seeing in which the gaze is absorbed into an 
immobile movement (Blanchot 1982, 32).  
This comprehension is in line with many of Barthes’s concerns. In Barthes, the 
fascination caused by photography is explained by a specific regime of presence that 
exceeds the presence in space, constituting a sort of “hallucinosis” (Barthes 1982, 13). 
This explains why Barthes locates photography at the extreme point of a movement of 
madness and desire, prompting a disturbing experience in which time and being are 
fissured. This is why, already in the final part of Camera Lucida, Barthes couples the 
exclamatory evidence of the “that-has-been”, previously mentioned right at the 
beginning of his book,
1
 with an “effect of madness”, ultimately associated with the 
temporal reality of the Winter Garden image.  
What Blanchot conceived of as the proximity imposed by the image through 
distance is comprehended by Barthes in terms of a temporal fold that mobilizes the 
viewer’s affective and subjective responses to photography. In this sense, the 
photographic image appears as a malleable membrane that puts into contact apparently 
unrelated realities that escape the supremacy of the viewer’s gaze.  
       
The spectral condition of time and presence 
The issue concerning the temporality of the photographic image defines the most 
important moments of Barthes’s phenomenological and ontological quest in Camera 
Lucida (we can say that, in this book, the phenomenology of the photographic image 
unfolds into a ontology of the image). Oddly, the problem of time is rarely addressed by 
Elkins, further limiting his reading of Barthes’s book, as well as the identification of 
common orientations of Barthes’s and Blanchot’s thinking regarding the image.  
In both Barthes and Blanchot, the fascination produced by the image must be 
understood as a metamorphosis not only of presence, but also of time. In both, the 
                                                          
1
 “One day, quite some time ago, I happened on a photograph of Napoleon’s youngest brother, Jerome, 
taken in 1852. And I realized then, with an amazement I have not been able to lessen since: ‘I am looking 
at eyes that looked at the Emperor.’” This amazement would be at the foundation of Barthes’s 
“ontological desire”, already mentioned above: “I was overcome by an ‘ontological’ desire: I wanted to 
learn at all costs what Photography was ‘in itself,’ by what essential feature it was to be distinguished 




spectral mode of presence converges with the spectrality of time, giving rise to what 
Blanchot termed as the immediately other. For Blanchot, “immediate presence is 
presence of what could not be present, presence of the non-accessible, presence 
excluding or exceeding any present” (Blanchot 1993, 38).  
In a little known essay, Georges Didi-Huberman would demonstrate that these 
concepts are also explored by Blanchot in his literary work. For example, in Au Moment 
Voulu, from 1951, Blanchot describes the rapturous encounter with a woman who 
suddenly appears behind a door; a woman once known, whose image of youth abruptly 
reappears in a fleeting and fulminating moment: 
 
I kept looking at her, I thought: Here, then, from where came my astonishment. Her 
face, or rather her expression, which hardly varied, halfway between the most cheerful 
smile and the coldest reserve, revived in me a terribly distant memory, and it was this 
memory, deeply buried, more than old, which she seemed to copy to appear so young 
(Blanchot quoted by Didi-Huberman 2011, 36-37).   
  
As Didi-Huberman notes, the similarity between the actual presence of the 
woman and the presence of who she was includes a gap, an interval that materializes the 
overlapping of past and present. In Barthes’s terms: “what I see has been here, in this 
place which extends between infinity and the subject (operator or spectator); it has been 
here, and yet immediately separated” (Barthes 1982, 77).  
In both Barthes and Blanchot, the image is formed at the level of this 
paradoxical relationship, when time is seen further back from the present, when 
something of the absent face starts to resemble the actual and vanishing expression. And 
all this, as Didi-Huberman writes, “[…] comes from a single blow, in the time of a door 
that opens up” (Didi-Huberman 2011, 37).  
Notably, this is also the time of the photographic shutter, which indelibly marks 
Barthes’s amazement towards the Winter Garden photograph. As stated by Batchen, by 
discovering “‘something like an essence of the Photograph’ (CL 73) [in the Winter 
Garden picture] Barthes traces its source to photography’s peculiar articulation of time - 
the way photography simultaneously conjures past, present, and future in a single image 
form” (Batchen 2009a, 13).   
In both Barthes and Blanchot, the now is seen as the return of something that is 




present. It exposes the boundless movement through which the naked presence of the 
other speaks in the mutism of a sudden face-to-face.  
Indeed, Camera Lucida engages the reader with the enigma of an encounter that 
haunts the entire book. The encounter concerns, more precisely, Barthes’s discovery of 
the Winter Garden photograph, which he describes as following: 
 
There I was, alone in the apartment where she had died, looking at these pictures of my 
mother, one by one, under the lamp, gradually moving back in time with her, looking 
for the truth of the face I had loved. And I found it (Barthes 1989, 67). 
 
Slightly further on: 
 
I studied the little girl and at last rediscovered my mother. The distinctness of her face, 
the naive attitude of her hands, the place she had docilely taken without either showing 
or hiding herself, and finally her expression, which distinguished her […] (Barthes 
1989, 69). 
 
Barthes’s encounter with the photograph designates, first of all, an event in 
which the order of time is radically disassembled. According to Blanchot, the convulsed 
time triggered by the image converges with the time of the narrative, giving expression 
to various durations, or chronometries, generated within the narrative itself (Blanchot 
2003, 12). Also in Barthes, the passages performed from image to writing, and vice 
versa, involve the intersection of such chronometries, that is to say, the coexistence of 
different durations that slowly infiltrate in each other. Hence the use of different times 
and verbal rhythms within very short passages: “where she had died”; “gradually 
moving back in time with her”; “And I found it”.  
As in Blanchot (and here I am specifically addressing the final part of Blanchot’s 
phrase quoted in Camera Lucida), it is a matter of following the strange and mysterious 
song of the Sirens, of conceiving of a pathway, or navigation, in “another time”, the 
time of the narrative (Blanchot 2003, 9). 
Blanchot says that the perversion of the image starts when “speech no longer 
presents itself as speech, but as sight freed from the limitations of sight. Not a way of 




Barthes’s writing fully converges with this idea: the idea that writing, in its poetic 
and essayistic form, is strictly related to the fascination caused by the image that 
penetrates the viewer, like a poignant instrument that causes a wound. (In this sense, for 
Barthes, the photograph constitutes a wound that appears in the place of the event; the 
photograph designates the (dis)placement of the portrayed object and the convulsion of 
the viewer’s perception, instigating a project of writing that aims at originating an 
abstract-universal).  
Therefore, contrary to what is advocated by Barthes’s detractors,
2
 Elkins 
included, the subjectivism ascribed to Camera Lucida is not synonym of “solipsism” 
and textual “hedonism” (Elkins 2007, 157). Instead, the book comprises what Jonathan 
Friday (2007, 161) dubbed an “autobiographical” movement that articulates the private 
and the public, the personal and the universal. Barthes himself asserted that “a 
subjectivity reduced to its hedonist project could not recognize the universal” (Barthes 
1982, 60). That way, Barthes demonstrates that his interest was to preserve a far more 
complicated interpretation of subjectivism. 
In the next section, I intend to deepen this issue in order to demonstrate that 
Barthes’s categories of studium and punctum must also be rethought under a new light, 
challenging Elkins’ rather conventional understanding of both terms.    
 
Image and writing: reassessing Barthes’s punctum 
In The Deaths of Roland Barthes (1981), Jacques Derrida argues that the Winter 
Garden photograph is the image that Barthes “neither shows nor hides” (the photograph, 
we should remember, is never reproduced), but of which “he speaks” (Derrida 2007, 
289). Derrida concludes that the photograph constitutes the punctum that irradiates 
Barthes’s book (which must be seen as the public event of writing).  
 
The Winter Garden Photograph, which he neither shows nor hides, which he speaks, is 
the punctum of the entire book. The mark of this unique wound is nowhere visible as 
such, but its unlocatable brightness or clarity (that of his mother’s eyes) irradiates the 
entire study. It makes of this book an irreplaceable event (Derrida 2007, 289).  
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In his first characterization of studium and punctum, Barthes establishes a 
distinction. The photographic studium corresponds to the realm of the cultural “taste”, 
including the photographer’s intentions and the visual codes of interpretation. The 
punctum, on the contrary, is an element of the photograph that “rises from the scene, 
shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me”, constituting the unique and incidental 
detail that captures the eye and the imaginary relations (Barthes 1982, 26). However, 
this opposition would become increasingly complex as the book progressed.  Derrida 
argues that, as articulated by Barthes, the punctum also inscribes the power of 
metonymic expansion. It pluralizes what is unique and singular, thereby invading the 
field of the studium, associated to the public and dominant uses of image and discourse.  
Therefore, Derrida argues that the relationship between the two concepts is not 
merely oppositional, as we might expect in the beginning, but intrinsically dynamic. 
Thus, the irreplaceable singularity of Barthes’s book (and, within it, of each 
photograph) simultaneously obeys a movement of repetition and pluralization through 
which the book is made available as a theoretical source. Elkins also fails to explore 
this idea by affirming that the punctum parallels the sublime and that it “couldn’t 
otherwise be put into a book or essay or academic paper”, that is to say, the systems 
through which knowledge is inscribed in the public space (Elkins 2007, 159).   
But, as argued by Batchen, what matters is not the distinction between studium 
and punctum, but “their poststructural inseparability”, “the dynamic play of this 
impossible relationship”, the “supplement” that displaces the punctum from its 
certainty, affirming its potentiality and reserve (which is why Barthes opts not to 
reproduce the Winter Garden photograph) (Batchen 2009b, 268). Therefore, according 
to Batchen, “what was once confined to only a few select photographs is, [Barthes] 
recognizes, a constituent element of all of them” (Batchen 2009b, 268).  
As a result, Batchen argues that Barthes’s book can even be read as a history of 
photography. Not the history of photography as a product of monolithic and 
deterministic descriptions, but an alternative model of a history of photography that 
does justice to the complex ways in which the visual image functions. This is a history 
whose composition incorporates the play between public and private, singularity and 
plurality, truth and fiction. A history capable of creating a resonant account that instills 
life into the multiple images of the high, and the low (or vernacular) cultures, examined 




This play of differences is diametrically opposed to the binarisms that support 
Elkins’ analysis. Elkins accuses Barthes’s punctum of being a “deliberate eccentricity”, 
an ordinary provider of memories, faces and melodramatic passions (Elkins 2011, 25). 
Barthes’s book would then appear as a kind of private pathos that develops in “safe 
territory”, using grief and loss as “the last remaining cover, the safest defense, the best 
fiction” (Elkins 2011, 25). That way, Elkins claims the need to consider a “less 
controllable practice” that would prevent us from being “distracted by faces and 
memories”, resisting sentimentality as an easy way out for photography. This is why, he 
claims, his collection of photographs includes “things like rocks, ice, and salt”, instead 
of portraits and human figures (Elkins 2011, 43). Already in What Do We Want 
Photography to Be? (2009), where he openly criticizes the trend of vernacular 
photography, Elkins claims “another photography, one that is not vernacular, does not 
rely on figures or recognizable scenes, that is less clearly a mirror of any viewer’s 
memories” (Elkins 2009, 176).  
First of all, the idea that Barthes’s theory is exclusively drawn from portraits and 
images of well-known photographers containing human figures is inaccurate. For 
example, despite not being included in some foreign editions, the Polaroid by French 
photographer Daniel Boudinet, chosen by Barthes as the frontispiece for his book, 
acquires a central role in its layout, emphasized by its color print on special glossy 
paper.  
The image, as described by Batchen, shows “the edge of a bed or couch with a 
pillow resting on it”; “[…] most of the picture is taken up with a diaphanous drawn 
curtain that overlaps in the center, obscuring our vision of what lies beyond. It parts a 
little as it touches the bed, allowing a flash of illumination” (Batchen 2009, 16).  
In Barthes, photography entails an indeterminable relation between figuration 
and abstraction. It inscribes a form of abstraction (time and absence) within figuration 
itself, endowing both the look and the image with a specific form of persistence: both 
continue to exist even when the visible is cancelled out as representation and iconic 
resemblance, giving place to the spectral condition of the photographic evidence.  
This is why, according to Batchen, “a number of scholars have argued that 
Boudinet’s Polaroid is a central, perhaps even the central, image in Barthes’s argument, 
despite never being mentioned by him” (Batchen 2009, 16-17). So, irrespective of the 




translated edition of La chambre claire that does not include the Boudinet image should 
be regarded as fatally flawed” (Batchen 2009, 16-17).    
Furthermore, in preserving an evaluation of photography that privileges good 
practices over bad practices, Elkins constructs a normative history that is utterly 
opposed to Barthes’s wider intentions of discovering “the nature of the photographic 
experience” (Batchen 2009b, 264). In contrast to Elkins’ arguments, the philosophical 
and even historical implications of Barthes’s punctum go well beyond the “need to find 
photographs touching” (Elkins 2011, 44). For Barthes, absence is not a synonym of 
lost: lost aspires to the restitution of a vanished unity, whereas absence integrates what 
remains of the past as the ultimate possibility of reinvention and future construction. As 
in Derrida, the specter is always revenant (something that has been and returns) and 
arrivant (something that announces the becoming), operating in the intersection of past, 
present and future (Derrida 1994, 5).  
In this regard, it will be equally important to demonstrate that Barthes’s punctum 
cannot be reduced to what Elkins defines as a nostalgic and sentimental form of 
memory, rather acquiring the meaning of a place of contestation, or “counter-memory” 
(Barthes 1982, 91).   
 
Barthes and Proust: involuntary memory and the ethical condition of time 
Now, I would like to return one last time to Blanchot’s quotation in Camera 
Lucida, in order to reveal the impact of counter-memory in Barthes’s theory. Actually, 
the phrase appears in the context of Blanchot’s discussion of the literary experience in 
Proust. Focusing on Proust’s monumental À la Recherche du Temps Perdu, Blanchot 
speaks of those impressions, those insignificant incidents (such as the experience of 
tasting a madeleine cake, the tinkling of cutlery, or stumbling on an uneven path) that 
emerge as singular and physically embodied instants of time. Through them, Proust 
becomes aware of his literary gift, and, more importantly, he discovers the very essence 
of literature: 
 
We see that what is given to [Proust] at that instant is not only the assurance of his 
calling, the affirmation of his gifts, but also the very essence of literature - he has touched 
it, experienced it in its pure state, by experiencing the transformation of time into an 
imaginary space (the space unique to images), in that moving absence, without events to 




becoming: that remoteness and distance that make up the milieu and the principle of 
metamorphoses and of what Proust calls metaphors. But it is no longer a matter of 
applying psychology; on the contrary, there is no more interiority, for everything that is 
interior is deployed outwardly, takes the form of an image. Yes, at this time, everything 
becomes image, and the essence of the image is to be entirely outside, without intimacy, 
and yet more inaccessible and more mysterious than the innermost thought; without 
signification, but summoning the profundity of every possible meaning; unrevealed and 
yet manifest, having that presence-absence that constitutes the attraction and the 
fascination of the Sirens (Blanchot 2003, 14).  
 
Any attempt to relate Proust’s literary work to photography would be considered 
counterproductive. Proust favors the tactile shocks, the sensations of hearing or tasting, 
in opposition to visuality, associated by Proust to the conscious and intelligible 
processes of thinking. As for photography, it embodies, for Proust, a form of cold and 
distant vision, cutting the object from the memories and sensations that involve the 
affective perception of reality. Barthes himself says that there is “nothing Proustian in a 
photograph” (Barthes 1982, 82). So, contrary to the conventional notion of memory, 
Barthes advances the alternative concept of “counter-memory”:  
 
[…] not only is the Photograph never, in essence, a memory (whose grammatical 
expression would be the perfect tense, whereas the tense of the Photograph is the 
aorist), but it actually blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory (Barthes 
1982, 91) 
 
However, without realizing it, Barthes converges with Proust’s understanding of 
time, engaging with his major conception of involuntary memory.  As noted by 
Blanchot, in Proust, the insignificant incident that went unnoticed escapes the order of 
consciousness, returning not as a memory, but as an “actual event” that interrupts the 
fabric of time (Blanchot 2003, 12). Also for Barthes, the “counter-memory” activated 
by the photograph is associated to the discovery of an event that disturbs the order of 
time. As Proust himself would put it, the involuntary memory is a memory freed from 
the order of time. Blanchot further observes that, given its fecundity, the contradiction 
in which Proust apparently falls is irrelevant: to be “out of time” is what allows him to 




Such pure time, shaped by the simultaneity of distinct temporalities that strike 
the subject as pure sensation, produces the fragmentation (or l’effondrement) of the self. 
This is an aspect that, as we have seen, also traverses Barthes’s theory. Moreover, in 
Proust, the simultaneity of two presences (that of the past and that of the present) forms 
the “unique ecstasy of time” (Blanchot 2003, 13): an experience in which two separate 
moments are combined, condensing the reality of time in a single, exorbitant instant.
3
  
The proximity with Barthes’s conceptualization of photography is evident. In 
Barthes, the immobilization of time in the photograph is given as an excess, as a 
violence through which the object is ripped from a continuum: “what I see has been 
here, in this place which extends between infinity and the subject” (Barthes 1982, 77).  
Similarly to Proust, Barthes therefore conceives of an experience of temporal ecstasy 
that would be particular important in his redefinition of the punctum. Completely 
ignored by Elkins, the following statement reveals to be crucial in our assessment of 
Barthes’s project: “[…] I now know that there exists another punctum (another 
‘stigmatum’) than the ‘detail’. This new punctum, which is no longer of form but of 
intensity, is Time, the lacerating emphasis of the noeme (‘that-has-been’), its pure 
representation” (Barthes 1982, 96).
 4
  
The temporality that can be travelled and made visible regardless of symbolic 
circuits explains the fascination caused by the Winter Garden photograph. In Batchen’s 
                                                          
3 In Proust the figure of Time comprises a rare experience, in which two sensations, or two real facts, 
coexist; both fight as if opponents, leading to the creation of a specific temporality that interpenetrates 
both past and present. As Blanchot writes: “Thus the footstep that stumbles on the irregular cobblestones 
of the Guermantes courtyard is suddenly-- nothing is more sudden-the same footstep that stumbled over 
the uneven flagstones of the Baptistery of San Marco: the same footstep, not ‘a double, an echo of a past 
sensation ... but this very sensation itself’: a minute incident, but deeply moving, one that tears apart the 
fabric of time and by this rending introduces us to another world: outside of time, says Proust hurriedly. 
Yes, he asserts, time is abolished, since, at once, in a real act of capturing - fugitive but irrefutable - I hold 
the Venice instant and the Guermantes instant, not a past and a present, but one single presence that 
causes incompatible moments, separated by the entire course of lived life, to coincide in a palpable 
simultaneity” (Blanchot 2003, 12-13). 
4 This is why, in Camera Lucida, Barthes examines, after the encounter with the Winter Garden picture, 
several photographs in which the ecstasy of time is suddenly revealed. For example, describing the 
astonishment caused by the photograph taken by Alexander Gardner of Lewis Payne, who was about to 
be hanged, Barthes formulates a paradoxical time where “He is dead and he is going to die”. We must 
also remember that August Salzmann’s photograph of the path of Beith-Lehem, near Jerusalem, prompts 
Bathes’s identification of three simultaneous times: “my present, the time of Jesus, and that of the 
photographer, all this under the instance of reality”. Finally, Barthes describes the Look of the child 
portrayed by Kertész as a sort of inhuman stare that crosses over the past and the actual present (Cf. 





words, it is “this suspension of time’s passage, this conjuring of [Barthes’s] mother as 
both alive and dead and therefore as neither, that moves him”. (Batchen 2009b, 267).  
In this passage, Batchen seems to intentionally evoke the neutral (neither this 
nor that, but an irreducible third), a concept that acquires a special significance in 
Barthes’s theory. The concept had been at the basis of Barthes’s penultimate course 
given at the Collège de France, entitled Le Neutre. Interestingly, the concept also gains 
an important role in Blanchot’s philosophy. The neutral designates a relation of third 
kind that suspends the totalizing and unitary forms of discourse. In this sense, 
Blanchot´s account of the neutral speaks eloquently to Barthes’s punctum as well: 
 
[…] the neutral cannot be represented, cannot be symbolized or even signified […] It is 
as though it were the infinite vanishing point from which the speech of the narrative, 
and within it all narratives and all speech about every narrative, would receive and lose 
their perspective: the infinite distance of their relations, their perpetual overturning and 
annulment (Blanchot 1993, 396).  
 
In Barthes, the image of “Death” plays the role of the neutral: it does not allow 
itself to be seized unitarily, it strikes us in its inaccessibility, and it is discovered by the 
subject as the fictive counterpoint of a disarranged actuality, multiplied in a supplement 
of place and presence. Indeed, death appears not as a social and symbolic rite of 
passage, but as a limit-experience of the living person, what Blanchot described as a 
powerful movement “through which meaning comes toward us, and we toward it” 
(Blanchot 1993, xvii). But it is the dynamics between meaning and its collapse that 
should be clearly preserved in both Blanchot and Barthes, undermining Elkins’ idea 
that Barthes’s punctum would correspond to a sort of “inviolate truth” (Elkins 2011, 
42). In Camera Lucida, the alien nature of the past and the sense of finitude expose the 
vulnerable condition of the subject, challenging the idea that personal thinking parallels 
the discursive powers to classify and to exercise absolute domination over the other and 
the past. 
As a result, the punctum should be preserved in its ethical implication as well. 
Rosalind Krauss points out that Barthes’s punctum had long been prepared and 
anticipated in his previous works, especially those in which the author rehearsed the 
idea of a third meaning, a third language that resists “the coercive powers of speech 




(Krauss 2009, 188). Batchen has also demonstrated that already in The Death of the 
Author, from 1967, Barthes called for an “open-ended textual practice”, a form of 
writing that would appear as “truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meanings is, in 
the end, to refuse God and his hypostases - reason, science, law” (Barthes quoted by 
Batchen 2009a, 8). Indeed, this is the opposite of what Elkins describes as the 
presumably “half-hidden religious meaning” of Barthes’s thinking (Elkins 2011, 86).    
Once again, we must move beyond Elkins, in order to conclude that the relation 
between Barthes and Blanchot also makes perfect sense here. For Blanchot, the essential 
feature of the neutral is not to allow ourselves to be grasped either in terms of 
immanence or in terms of transcendence (Blanchot 1993, 432). Similarly, Barthes’s 
punctum urges the reader to think photography in terms of a non-univocal relationship 
that brings to the fore the concepts of time and absence. For Michael Fried, only on this 
basis will it be possible to challenge the “unary” photograph that defines the image-
consuming regime (Fried 2009, 151).  
We should note that for Barthes “the Photograph is unary when it emphatically 
transforms ‘reality’ without doubling it, without making it vacillate (emphasis is a 
power of cohesion): no duality, no indirection, no disturbance” (Barthes 1982, 41). In 
the final page of Camera Lucida, Barthes closes the book with a very similar idea: 
 
Mad or tame? Photography can be one or the other: tame if its realism remains relative, 
tempered by aesthetic or empirical habits (to leaf through a magazine at the 
hairdresser's, the dentist's); mad if this realism is absolute and, so to speak, original, 
obliging the loving and terrified consciousness to return to the very letter of Time: a 
strictly revulsive movement which reverses the course of the thing, and which I shall 
call, in conclusion, the photographic ecstasy (Barthes 1982, 119). 
 
As argued by Sharon Sliwinski, Barthes’ punctum constitutes “an attempt to 
describe what is indelible in photography itself”.  Accordingly, “more than a particular 
detail”, the punctum “can be thought of as the very means by which photography makes 
the ineffable actually appear” (Sliwinski 2007, 250).  
Following Sliwinski, I would add that the punctum makes time actually appear, 
configuring it as a form of duration that can be either the experience of suspension of 
Boudinet’s polaroid; or the experience concerning the simultaneity between past and 




a past reality, related to the desire and the fascination of haunting images, as in the case 
of the Winter Garden photograph.  
 The relationship with a past that is not simply known, but materially felt, is the 
opposite of a mythical platonic time that would render the punctum as “a way of 
smuggling in a notion of the ineffable or nonverbal” (Elkins 2007, 159). Elkins 
completely underestimates the reach of Barthes’s punctum. On the one hand, he 
examines the punctum in terms of the conventional dualism between the studium and 
the punctum, failing to grasp the idea that, in Barthes’s Camera Lucida, the subjective 
experience of photography involves a textual action through which the personal and the 
public domains are intersected. On the other hand, Elkins moves too quickly to an 
association between the affective, or the non-cognitive experience of the image, and 
transcendence, confusing the punctum with the ineffable and the unspeakable.  
Contrary to Elkins’s interpretation, according to which the punctum is a way of 
guarantying a sublime, Barthes’s punctum witnesses the very shattering of conventional 
modes of perception and thinking, contributing, still today, to questioning redemptive 
and univocal narratives around the significance of photography.   
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